Mandatory auditor rotation : a means of reducing the expectation gap? by Weißenberger, Barbara E.
  
 
 
 JUSTUS-LIEBIG- 
          UNIVERSITÄT 
          GIESSEN 
 
 
 
 
PD Dr. Barbara E. Weißenberger 
 
Mandatory Auditor Rotation:  
A Means of Reducing the Expectation Gap? 
 
Working Paper 3 / 2002 
(Revised Version)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– Arbeitspapiere Industrielles Management und Controlling – 
 
 
Herausgeber:   Professur für Betriebswirtschaftslehre mit dem Schwerpunkt Industrielles   
     Management und Controlling (Prof. Dr. Barbara E. Weißenberger)  
      Justus-Liebig-Universität, Gießen  
     http://wiwi.uni-giessen.de/controlling/  
 
 
JEL-Classification:  C72, G18, M40 
 
 
Habilitationsvortrag an der WHU Otto-Beisheim-Hochschule, Vallendar, am 20.09.2002  
 
 
 
 
- 1 - 
 
 
 
Mandatory Auditor Rotation: A Means of Reducing the Expectation Gap? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes whether mandatory auditor rotation is a means to reduce an expectation 
gap caused by moral hazard problems. The analysis is divided into two parts with reference to 
the two different types of auditor rotation systems: (1) rotation of audit firms, and (2) rotation 
of audit partners.  
In the case of mandatory rotation of audit firms, it can be shown by a multi-period agency 
model that the first best solution, i.e. the closing of the expectation gap, cannot be achieved. 
Additionally, any beneficial effect on audit quality induced by monitoring instruments is 
reduced. 
In the second case of audit partner rotation, a first best solution may be achieved. A hold-up 
problem leading to personal under-investment in audit quality may nevertheless reduce the 
principal's first best utility below the level of a no-rotation system. 
The conclusion is that none of the two auditor rotation systems should be made mandatory.  
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1. Introduction 
As a reaction to the spectacular cases of balance sheet manipulation and auditor failure 
– ENRON and the resulting downfall of Arthur Andersen being the most prominent 
example -  which have been observed since 2001, mandatory auditor rotation has 
become a much-discussed regulatory instrument in several countries to increase auditor 
independence and therefore reduce the so-called expectation gap.  
In this respect, a much-cited example is the United States of America’s Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, which has made auditor rotation mandatory for all SEC registrants. More 
specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires both audit partners as well as review 
partners of any SEC registrant to be rotated within the audit firm after a period of five 
years (audit partner rotation).  
Nevertheless, many other countries have either preceded or followed this example. For 
example, Germany since 1998 has implemented via the KonTraG (Gesetz zur Kontrolle 
und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich) a similar rule on mandatory audit partner 
rotation for the auditors of officially listed companies (amtlicher Handel) after a period 
of seven years (§ 319 Par. 3 No. 6 of the German Commercial Code).  
Rules on mandatory audit partner rotation with respect to listed companies can also be 
found in Canada (with regard to local banks), the United Kingdom, Ireland, Singapore 
(with the exception of local banks who have to rotate audit firms after five years). Other 
countries, e.g. Greece or Italy, even require the rotation of audit firms after a given 
period of time (audit firm rotation) with respect to listed companies. An audit firm 
rotation rule has also been discussed in the United States of America prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act but has not (yet) been made effective. 
On the other hand, countries like Australia and New Zealand as well as several supra-
national institutions, e.g. the Commission of the European Communities or the IFAC 
(International Federation of Accountants) have decided to recommend auditor rotation 
only on a non-compulsory basis.  
These divergent ways of handling the regulation on auditor rotation leads to the 
research question whether a recurrent change of auditors indeed enhances audit quality 
and reduces the expectation gap. The latter can be interpreted as a result of moral 
hazard problems between the auditor (agent) and the firm's investors (principal) 
(Biener, 1995; Sweeney, 1997): As investors are not able to observe the auditor's effort 
in producing a statement on the firm’s financial position, the auditor might be tempted 
to reduce personally costly efforts, resulting in a decrease of expected audit quality. In 
this context, the expectation gap is equivalent to the agency costs the investors have to 
carry.  
Reviewing the existing literature on auditor rotation, arguments both in favor as well as 
against mandatory auditor rotation systems can be found. Winters (1978) and 
Kemp/Reckers/Arrington (1983) argue, for example, that mandatory auditor rotation 
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increases auditor independence and therefore audit quality by reducing the incentive for 
collusive action between auditor and audited firm. Bales/Ingram/Reckers (1982) and 
Tan (1995) also support mandatory auditor rotation by referring to an increase in 
auditor productivity induced by short audit cycles. They argue that a long-term auditor-
client relationship reduces the auditor's ability to integrate skepticism into his audit. 
Having worked for too long a time with the client's given accounting system, he is less 
likely to detect fraud and irregularities.  
On the other hand, empirical research indicates a significantly higher degree of 
undetected fraud and errors in the first two auditing periods as the auditor seems to need 
some time to familiarize himself with the client's accounting system (see e.g. IDW, 
1997 referring to a study conducted by the AICPA in 1992). The empirical research is 
supported by the theoretical discussion put forward by Hoyle (1978) and 
Petty/Cuganesan (1996). They fear that mandatory auditor rotation leads to higher 
production costs of the auditor's output under a given quality. They argue that errors 
and irregularities that would be detected during a longtime auditor client relationship 
might go unchecked. Additionally, short audit engagements might make it difficult for 
the auditor to deeply understand large and complex corporation structures. 
Arrunada/Paz-Arres (1997) and Summer (1998) disapprove of mandatory auditor 
rotation as short audit cycles may restrict the auditor’s capability to build up reputation 
and therefore reduce the incentive to maintain a high level of audit quality. 
Arrunada/Paz-Arres additionally point out that especially the rotation of audit firms 
reduces competition in the narrow oligopolistic market for auditing services (Big Four).  
Herzig/Watrin (1995) and Vanstraelen (2000) discuss mandatory auditor rotation with 
regards to renewable long-term audit mandates. Herzig/Watrin focus on the problems of 
a long-term auditor-client-relationship which reduces the client’s shareholders potential 
to use auditor switching as an incentive device. They argue that in this context any type 
of mandatory auditor rotation reduces this potential even further. Vanstraelen, on the 
other hand, gives empirical evidence that restrictions in auditor switching lead to a 
decrease in auditor quality which may call for mandatory auditor rotation as a counter-
device.  
Shifting the focus to the international audit profession, mandatory auditor rotation is 
traditionally rejected (see e.g. Pearson, 1980; Anonymous, 1993). As the discussion on 
mandatory auditor rotation in theory as well as in practice leads to rather ambiguous 
results, we want to introduce the question of moral hazard in the case of mandatory 
auditor rotation in order to gain additional insights. More specifically, we intend to 
show that mandatory auditor rotation might be a counter-productive measure in the light 
of existing moral hazard problems between investor and auditor, hindering a bridging of 
the expectation gap. This result - considered either in isolation or in conjunction with 
the traditional arguments on auditor rotation - indicates that no type of auditor rotation 
system should be made mandatory. The audit profession's point of view of 
implementing auditor rotation individually is therefore not to be taken as an expression 
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of competitive pressure among audit firms, but as an efficient solution with respect to a 
company's investors. 
We start our analysis by first discussing the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation on 
moral hazard. We show that moral hazard issues tend to be solved by multi-period 
contingent contracts if audit quality is observable by all parties involved, i.e. if the 
auditor's report is an experience good. In that case, the introduction of mandatory audit 
firm rotation is likely to obstruct the reduction of agency costs, thus opening up a new 
expectation gap. If audit quality is not observable by a firm's investors, i.e. if the 
auditor's report is a credence good, two cases are possible: Either a fixed contract is 
agreed upon, in which case mandatory audit firm rotation has no effect on the amount of 
agency costs, or a contingent contract is implemented based on behavioral or result 
monitoring instruments. In this case, mandatory audit firm rotation once again obstructs 
the reduction of agency costs, as it does in the case of experience goods. 
We then expand our analysis to mandatory audit partner rotation as implemented in 
most existing auditor rotation systems. We show that audit partner rotation may lead to 
a first best solution if an appropriate payment scheme is implemented by the audit firm. 
Nevertheless, the problem of audit quality is not yet resolved, as audit partner rotation 
may lead to personal underinvestment in audit quality. Consequently, the first best level 
of audit quality under mandatory audit partner rotation might be below the first best 
level or even the second best level without mandatory rotation.  
In the following section 2 we will propose our model, showing also in how far the 
elements of our model correspond to the present German corporate governance system. 
Section 3 discusses the case of mandatory audit firm rotation. Section 4 deals with 
issues of mandatory audit partner rotation. Section 5 concludes our discussion.  
2. The model 
To analyze the effects of mandatory auditor rotation on moral hazard in the relationship 
between a firm's auditor and its investors, i.e. shareholders and investors, we establish 
an agency model in which the firm's supervisory board is assumed to be the auditor's 
principal. 
Before continuing the description of our model, we want to make some short remarks 
on the role of the firm's supervisory board in the German corporate governance system 
and the choice of letting it represent the auditor's principal in our model, as this is a 
slight variation on the traditional agency models on auditing (Antle, 1982; 
Baiman/Evans/Noel, 1987; Ballwieser, 1987; Ewert, 1990). 
In Germany, as in most Central European countries, the board of directors is divided 
into the supervisory board and the executive board. Together with the shareholders' 
meeting they establish the three organs of a stock corporation. It is the duty of the 
executive board to carry out the firm's day-to-day operation. This is monitored by the 
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supervisory board whose members are elected according to the laws of codetermination 
partly by the shareholders' meeting and partly by the corporation's employees.  
On the part of the shareholders, the supervisory board usually seats directors of friendly 
companies and former members of the executive committee, but also high bank 
representatives due to the strong influence of the German banking system on the credit 
market. On the part of the employees, the supervisory board seats union members and 
some of the firm's employees themselves. Consequently, the German supervisory board 
represents shareholders, creditors and employees as three important groups of 
stakeholders. The auditor is appointed by the shareholders' meeting based on a 
proposition made by the supervisory board, which is usually followed. 
The second reason for focusing our attention on the supervisory board is the fact that 
the quality of its monitoring of the executive board depends crucially on the relationship 
to the auditor and on the existence of moral hazard in this relationship. We will show in 
section 3 that mandatory auditor rotation is a counterproductive measure with respect to 
this intention. 
In the following, we assume that the supervisory board delegates the checking of the 
firm's financial statements to the auditor as an economic agent. The auditor produces a 
long-form audit report based upon personally costly and non-trivial effort. After 
delivering the audit report, the auditor receives a payment s(). As the auditor's chosen 
level of effort in producing the audit report may not be observed by the supervisory 
board, a moral hazard problem may arise.  
Referring to the present German corporate governance system, the order to check the 
firm's financial statements is formally given to the auditor by the firm’s supervisory 
board. Consequently, our model takes a rather idealistic perspective with reference to 
the present system by attributing all contractual power on the part of the principal to the 
supervisory board, which is nevertheless still in line with the broad understanding of 
contracts in neo-institutional theory.  
The audit report as the auditor's output can be interpreted as an information structure   
on the financial statements presented by the executive board. It is thus a nonmonetary 
asset, to which some monetary value D can be attributed. D is the gross value of the 
information structure   before the deduction of the auditor's remuneration s(). D may 
be either positive or negative depending on other information structures the supervisory 
board has access to. If, for example, the supervisory board has to decide whether to use 
information structure   or another information structure  ' without being able to use 
them in combination, then D > 0 if   is a better information structure than  ' and D  0 
otherwise. If the value D is negative, then the supervisory board should not use the 
auditor's report   in the decision making process, e.g. when deciding whether to accept 
or to reject the financial statements presented.  
Note that a ranking of information structures may not always be possible on a general 
basis, but with reference to a given decision problem and a given utility function U: 
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 1 >  2 if E[U, 1] > E[U, 2] and  1   2 otherwise. For this rule to apply, we have to 
assume in addition that the supervisory board's preference order can be represented by a 
given Bernoulli utility function. This implies not necessarily a single-person approach, 
but only the absence of conflicts of interest among the supervisory board's members 
which may, for example, have been neutralized by some additional organizational or 
contractual measures.  
We assume D to be dependent on the auditor's chosen level of effort e in the auditing 
process and on an exogenous random variable , representing the risk that even in a 
diligently conducted auditing process some errors, frauds, or mistakes might remain 
undetected: D = D(e,) with De > 0. If the supervisory board is not able to identify the 
chosen level of effort e ex post, this asymmetric information causes a moral hazard 
problem: The auditor is tempted to choose a minimum level of effort emin and to 
attribute low values of D to unfavorable states of .  
The loss in expected utility E[U(D-s()] caused as the supervisory board is not able to 
commit the auditor to the desired level of effort e* is measured by agency costs. These 
agency costs are interpreted as expectation gap, indicating to which extend the 
supervisory board's expectations are not met. A rational principal minimizes agency 
costs by integrating contractual elements into s() that motivate the agent to choose a 
level of effort e > emin.  
Such a contractual element might consist for example in a multi-period contingent 
design with memory if the agent is risk-averse. In that case, there is ex ante an 
understanding between the principal and agent on a long-term relationship in which the 
remuneration of each period t is not only dependent on the realization of the agreed-
upon contingencies in this period, but also on the realizations in the past periods t-1, t-2, 
etc. Such a contingency can be, for example, the observed value D or a monitoring 
variable with respect to the auditor's effort. 
It is important for our model that in the relationship between supervisory board and 
auditor such a multi-period design does not necessarily imply the auditor's multi-period 
appointment. A multi-period contract effectively decreasing agency costs is already 
implemented if the supervisory board commits itself to proposing a prolongation of the 
auditing contract at the shareholders' meeting based upon the realization of the agreed-
upon contingencies. Nevertheless, such a type of multi-period contract should have a 
somewhat weaker effect on the reduction of agency costs compared to a multi-period 
appointment as the agent does not know for sure if he is going to be employed in future 
periods.We therefore assume that such a multi-period contract between supervisory 
board and auditor is implemented if it leads to a reduction of agency costs.  
The contractual design s() the supervisory board may offer to the auditor finally 
depends on the observability of D. In the traditional agency model, the value of the 
agent's output to the principal is usually observable so that some type of contingent 
contract s(D) will be implemented as an incentive device motivating the auditor to 
choose a level of effort e > emin. Nevertheless, it may also be possible that the value D is 
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not observable by the supervisory board, e.g. if it cannot conclude in how far an action 
indicated by the auditor's report has beneficial or detrimental effects on the expected 
utility. In this latter case, we will describe the auditor's report as a credence good, and 
otherwise as an experience good.  
This classification is based on the works of Nelson (1970) and Darby/Karni (1973). 
They classify goods and services according to the (potential) buyer's ability to 
determine relevant product qualities. Based on this classification, phenomena in 
industrial organization, e.g. the existence of monopolies (Nelson, 1970), or in welfare 
economics, e.g. the welfare loss caused by overselling in medical and other services 
(Darby/Karni, 1973), are examined.  
In this paper, the classification of experience goods and credence goods is used to 
analyze the auditing sector. It can be shown that mandatory auditor rotation has 
different effects on moral hazard problems depending on whether the auditor's output is 
an experience good or a credence good and depending on the set of contracts available. 
This will be analyzed in the following section.  
3. Mandatory rotation of audit firms 
Mandatory rotation of audit firms demands not only a change in audit partners but also 
the appointment of another audit firm after a given number of periods. It is therefore the 
strictest type of auditor rotation system and is explicitly implemented only in few 
countries. Nevertheless, with respect to small audit firms a mandatory audit partner 
rotation also results in a rotation of audit firms, if they do not have enough resources to 
implement rotation internally. 
The case of experience goods 
If the auditor's report is an experience good, the supervisory board is able to verify its 
monetary value D at some time during the contractual relationship with the auditor. We 
assume that in the case of mandatory auditor rotation the audit firm has to be changed 
after one period whereas in the absence of mandatory rotation a two-period contract 
would be agreed upon: the supervisory board promises to propose a renewal of the 
contract to the shareholders' meeting after the first period.  
We assume that the supervisory board's utility function U depends on D and on some 
remuneration s(D) paid to the auditor. s consists not only of the audit fees to be paid in 
the present period, but also of additional elements, e.g. the possibility to negotiate an 
increase in audit fees during the contract renewal or to sell additional consulting 
services. In the case of a two-period contract, the payment scheme for the first period is 
s1(D1) and s2(D1,D2) for the second period. The exogenous risks  1 and  2 in each 
period t are assumed to be stochastically independent.  
The auditor's utility function V = N(D)-H(e) depends on s as well as on e, and the 
auditor will only agree to work for the supervisory board if his expected utility E[V] 
- 8 - 
 
equals at least some reservation utility Vmin. We finally assume that the auditor is risk-
averse so that any contingent contract s() does not represent the optimal risk-sharing 
rule. 
In the case of mandatory rotation of auditor firms, solving the supervisory board's 
maximizing problem E[U(D)-s(D)] subject to E[V]   Vmin and to e = arg max E[V] 
leads, e.g. via the first-order-condition-approach to the familiar condition for the 
optimal contractual design s: 
(1)
U' D  s D 
 
N' s(D) 
  	 

f' D | e 
f D | e 
 
The -term in condition (1) indicates the existence of agency costs, as in the first best 
situation with e = e* and agency costs of zero the 

-term vanishes.  
In the case of no mandatory rotation, the supervisory board implements a two-period 
contract. Lambert (1983) has shown that in such a model the condition for the optimal 
contractual design s in the second period changes to  
(2)
U 2 ' D2  s2 D1, D2  
N' 2 s2 D1 , D2  
   1
f1' D1 | e1 
f1 D1 | e1 
 2
f2 ' D2 | e2 
f1 D1 | e1 f2 D2 | e2 
 
The second -term indicates that the agency costs decrease in comparison to the one-
period model by implementing the two-period contract. The economic intuition behind 
this is the diversification of exogenous risk  made possible by s2(D1,D2): it is 
improbable that with high efforts in both periods a negative state of 

 will lead to an 
unfavorable result D. The resulting income smoothing with respect to the auditor is 
indicated by the expectancy values of the conditions for the optimal contractual designs: 
E[Ut'/Vt'] =  in each period t (Lambert, 1983). 
Comparing (1) and (2) we find that mandatory rotation of audit firms obstructs a 
decrease in agency costs that can be achieved by a two-period contract. Extending our 
model to more than two periods, this result becomes even more distinct: Rubinstein 
(1979) and Radner (1981) have shown that the more periods are included ex ante into a 
multi-period contract with memory, the stronger the reduction of agency costs with a 
risk-averse agent. If the number of periods is infinite, then agency costs are zero and the 
first best solution is achieved: the auditor chooses the desired level of effort e* as the 
exogenous risk  can now be fully diversified and does not have any negative incentive 
effects anymore.  
Even though the mathematical construct of infinity at first sight does not seem to have 
any relevance with respect to auditing practice, it can be interpreted as the contracting 
parties' understanding that after each period of cooperation another period will follow. 
This interpretation matches the state of the auditing sector in Germany under the present 
corporate governance system without mandatory auditor rotation.  
Figure 1 indicates this result graphically. The first best solution serves as a benchmark 
for the second best solution. The difference between both functions represents the 
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agency costs or the expectation gap which tends to be closed with an increasing number 
of periods contracted.  
If this is obstructed by mandatory rotation of audit firms in period T part of the agency 
costs remain. A gap opens up that represents the supervisory board's expectations of 
lower audit quality.  
Figure 1 
Mandatory rotation of audit firms in the case of experience goods 
first best solution
second best solution 
(experience goods)
E[U]
number of 
periods contracted
period T: 
rotation of auditing firm
 expecation gap 
caused by rotation of 
auditing firm
agency costs
 
Mandatory auditor rotation in the case of experience goods can be interpreted as an 
artificial restriction on the class of available contracts that is likely to lead to a Pareto-
deterioration as the auditor in all cases receives just his reservation utility Vmin whereas 
the supervisory board's expected utility is likely to be reduced as part of the agency 
costs remain. 
Only if the period T of mandatory rotation is so late that by T no significant level of 
agency costs remains does the mandatory auditor rotation prove not to be harmful, but - 
with respect to the moral hazard problem - neither will it be helpful. The decrease of 
agency costs also depends on the auditor's risk-aversion: the more the auditor tends to 
be risk-neutral, the stronger agency costs are decreased so that an early rotation period 
T should create a smaller expectation gap than with a strongly risk-averse auditor.  
The case of credence goods 
If the auditor's report is a credence good, the supervisory board is not able to verify the 
monetary value D of the auditor's output at any time during the contractual relationship 
with the auditor. Consequently, any contractual design s(D) can no longer be 
implemented.  
In the simplest case, the supervisory board now offers a fixed contract sfix to the auditor. 
Such a type of contract has no incentive power so that under the existing information 
asymmetry the auditor will choose the minimum level of effort emin. To maximize 
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expected utility E[U] in this situation, sfix has to be set so small that even under e = emin 
the auditor just receives his reservation utility Vmin: s = sfix,min. Price competition among 
audit firms can be interpreted as an empirical indication for such a situation. 
With a fixed contract sfix,min, the agency costs to be incurred by the supervisory board 
are maximal and do not depend on the numbers of periods contracted. Figure 1 
therefore changes to Figure 2: the second best solution does not approach the first best 
solution. The existing expectation gap is not influenced by the mandatory auditor 
rotation in period T; the auditor rotation system therefore is unnecessary. 
Figure 2 
Mandatory rotation of audit firms in the case of credence goods 
first best solution
second best solution 
(credence goods)
E[U]
number of 
periods contracted
period T: 
rotation of auditing firm
agency-Kostenexisting expectation gap
 
The constant level of expected utility in the second best situation independent of the 
number of periods contracted is nevertheless unsatisfactory. There should exist some 
contractual elements that allow the implementation of a contingent contract regardless 
of the credence character of the auditor's output.  
Such contractual elements are provided by additional monitoring instruments. They can 
be used by the supervisory board to gain additional information on the auditor's efforts 
(behavioral monitoring) or on the value of the auditor's output (result monitoring). In 
the case of experience goods, such monitoring instruments tend to be infeasible if they 
are costly: result monitoring gives no additional information as the output value can be 
observed free of cost. Behavioral monitoring tends not to contribute significantly to the 
reduction of agency costs even with a very risk-averse agent if a multi-period contract is 
implemented: the costless observation of D supersedes the use of other, costly 
monitoring instruments.  
In the case of credence goods, however, the use of such monitoring instruments gains 
importance. If, for example, a behavioral monitoring system {mb} is used, a contingent 
contract of the type s(mb) is implemented with mb = (e, b),  b being some exogenous 
monitoring risk independent of . Already the condition for the optimal contract in the 
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one-period model shows the potential of such a contract for reducing agency costs 
(Weißenberger, 1997): 
(3)
E
 
U' D  s mb   
N' s(mb ) 
 	 
 
f' mb | e 
f m b | e 
 
Similar to Lambert's (1983) model it can be shown that in a two-period model agency 
costs decrease compared to the one-period model and that E[E

(Ut')/Nt'] = .  
Condition (3) shows a second aspect: even though behavioral monitoring may be used 
by the supervisory board as an incentive device with respect to the auditor, it gives no 
additional information with respect to the level of D under a given level of , hence the 
expectancy value E

[Ut']. It indicates that the level of expected utility the supervisory 
board reaches with an optimal contract s(mb) is reduced by the possibility of rejecting 
the auditor's report even though D > 0 (alpha mistake) or accepting the auditor's report 
even though D < 0 (beta mistake). 
An alternative to behavioral monitoring is result monitoring {mr}: it gives information 
on the level of D and thus reduces the probability of an alpha/beta mistake. 
Additionally, {mr} can be used as an incentive device with respect to the auditor's 
efforts as D = D(e,). If we assume that the monitoring risk r is independent of the 
exogenous risk , the condition for the optimal contractual design s(mr) in a one-period 
model is (Weißenberger, 1997) 
(4)
U' D s mr  
N' s(mr ) 
   
f' mr | D 
f mr | D 
f' D | e 
f D | e 
 
Similar to Lambert's (1983) model it can also be shown with result monitoring that in a 
two-period model, agency costs decrease compared to the one-period model, and that 
E[Ut'/Nt'] = .  
The ﬀ-term in condition (4) indicates that result monitoring can be interpreted as a 
garbling in the sense of Blackwell's theorem of the behavioral monitoring system {D} 
used in the case of experience goods. So the increase in expected utility by avoiding at 
least partly the alpha/beta mistake is to some degree set off by a decrease in incentive 
effects: agency costs can be reduced by implementing {mr} into the contract, but the 
reduction tends to be slower than with a good behavioral monitoring system {mb}. 
Nevertheless, in an infinite model, agency costs are zero with both types of monitoring 
so that in such a case result monitoring is more valuable than behavioral monitoring 
independent of the monitoring risks r and b. 
Summarizing the results, by using monitoring information as a contingency in the 
contract between supervisory board and auditor, a decrease in agency costs can be 
achieved similar to that attained in the case of experience goods.  
Behavioral monitoring can, for example, be implemented by peer reviews. In a peer 
review, the auditing process is analyzed, which should give a clear indication on e but 
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does not help to identify the state of the exogenous auditing risk  . As a peer review is 
conducted by a third party, there might arise some additional moral hazard with respect 
to the third party weakening the information provided by the peer review.  
Result monitoring gives joint information on e and 
 
. It could be carried out by audit 
committees, i.e. a specialized group of members of the supervisory board. Another type 
of result monitoring is measuring customer satisfaction, e.g. by a service gap model 
(Parasuraman/Zeithaml/Berry, 1988).  
Summarizing our arguments presented in section 3, in the case of credence goods as 
well as in the case of experience goods, auditor rotation systems that directly or 
indirectly cause a rotation of audit firms should not be made mandatory.  
4. Mandatory audit partner rotation  
In this section we discuss the effects of audit partner rotation on the expectation gap 
constituted by moral hazard problems with respect to the auditor's efforts. Mandatory 
audit partner rotation demands a change in audit partners after a given number of 
periods. It is therefore a less strict type of auditor rotation system, but can be 
implemented only if the audit firms have enough resources to rotate auditing 
assignments internally.  
Our analysis in section 3 has shown that the main problem with mandatory rotation of 
audit firms is its restricting the class of available contingent contracts to rather short-
term contracts, including periods only up to the rotation period. Consequently, the 
beneficial effects of long-term contracts with memory, including in extremis an infinite 
number of periods, on the reduction of agency costs can only become partly effective. 
With mandatory audit partner rotation, the pitfalls of such a short-term perspective can 
be avoided, as the audit firm is able to act as a contractual intermediary between its 
clients on the one hand and the individual audit partners organized in the audit firm on 
the other hand.  
With respect to the contract established between the audit firm and its clients, there are 
under mandatory audit partner rotation systems no direct restrictions: a long-term 
contract may be established, decreasing agency costs with respect to the audit firm's 
moral hazard towards zero. In the simplest case of audit quality being an experience 
good, a multi-period contract of the type sk(Dk) is implemented between the supervisory 
board of a firm k and the audit firm, independent of which individual audit partner 
actually conducts the audit in each period t, but contingent on the level of Dk realized in 
present and past periods.  
A second type of contract has to be established between the audit firm and the 
individual audit partners, who now take the role of subcontractors with respect to the 
auditing assignments taken on by the audit firm. To introduce a long-term perspective 
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into an audit partner's strategic choice of effort, the payment scheme has to be separated 
from the number of periods the audit partner is assigned to some auditing project k.  
The audit firm can, for example, offer a multi-period contract s'(D) depending on the 
level of audit quality observed in any auditing projects conducted in the past and 
present periods by the audit partner in question. In that case, the audit partner is 
indifferent to changes in his assignments caused by a mandatory rotation system, as the 
level of audit quality D based on this strategic choice of effort e in each period t is 
independent of the clients k he is auditing: he is only interested in realizing an optimal 
level of D in each period t.  
Consequently, the first best solution is approached as described in Figure 1 and - under 
the given assumption - in an infinite model even realized: agency costs are zero and the 
expectation gap is thus closed.  
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that it is not mandatory audit partner 
rotation that is the reason for a reduction of agency costs, but rather the fact that it 
allows a specific type of long-term contracts so that in spite of mandatory audit partner 
rotation agency costs decrease. We therefore have to discuss whether there are any 
possible adverse effects not healed by separating the payment scheme from the number 
of periods the audit partner is assigned to a given auditing project k. Such an adverse 
effect might be caused if the audit partners have the potential for creating a hold-up 
situation.  
Let us assume that conducting any audit project k requires a specific investment i made 
by the audit partner at the beginning of the project. Such an investment could, for 
example, be the accumulation of individual knowledge with respect to the client or the 
client's industry. The investment i is desirable from the supervisory board's k point of 
view as it is assumed that it will exercise a positive effect on audit quality in all periods 
t independent of the chosen level of effort e: Dk'(i) > 0.  
From the audit partner's point of view, i leads to higher income at least in the those 
periods in which Dk is a contingency in his payment scheme. Additionally, i is 
beneficial as it decreases the liability risks caused by undetected errors, frauds, or 
irregularities in the firm's k financial statements. The investment i thus leads to the 
building up of reputation and may even help the audit partner to sell additional 
consulting projects with a positive return.  
We now assume that the specific investment i is verifiable by all contractual parties 
involved, but not enforceable on the audit partner. He can be committed neither legally 
nor contractually to making such a specific investment of a given amount i.  
To identify the level of i an audit partner undertakes in a no-rotation system versus an 
audit partner rotation system, we will once again establish a two-period model (Hart, 
1995). We assume that in the no-rotation system, a two-period contract is established 
with the audit partner, whereas in the audit partner rotation system a one-period contract 
has to be implemented as the audit partners are assumed to rotate after one period.  
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The audit partner may undertake a specific investment in period t = 1 with the amount i 
and i' > 0 and i" > 0 with respect to an audit project k. The audit partner's additional 
income resulting from i is R1(i) > 0 in t = 1 and R2(i) > 0 in t = 2 if the specific 
investment is made, with Rt'(i) > 0 and Rt"(i) < 0. If i is not undertaken at all, the 
additional income in both periods is r < Rt(i). The rate of interest is assumed to be zero.  
We set 2r < R1(i)+R2(i), so that the audit partner in a no-rotation system will undertake 
a specific investment i if 2r < R1(i)+R2(i)-i. (5) then shows the first order condition for 
the optimal amount i: 
(5)
d R1 i  
d i

d R2 i  
d i
 i'
 
Comparing this result to the audit partner rotation system, the auditor will undertake a 
specific investment only if r < R1(i)+i, as now only the results achieved in the first 
period are relevant to him. Any results R2(i) are relevant to the new audit partner taking 
up the assignment k after the rotation. The first order condition for the optimal amount i 
now changes to 
(6)
d R1 i  
d i
 i' rotation
 
Based on the assumptions on the slope of Rt(i) and i, comparing conditions (5) and (6) 
leads to conclusion (7), indicating the problem of underinvestment: 
(7) irotation  i
 
The idea of the underinvestment problem has already been conveyed indirectly by the 
traditional arguments against auditor rotation. First, an increase in auditing costs caused 
by mandatory auditor rotation implies that a given specific investment becomes too 
costly in a short-term versus long-term assignment. Second, a decrease in auditor 
productivity attributed to mandatory auditor rotation implies the decreasing incentive to 
undertake a specific investment i in a short-term versus long-term assignment. 
The underinvestment in i is not desirable as it decreases the supervisory board's k level 
of expected utility independent of the level of effort the audit partner chooses. To 
include the underinvestment problem, Figures 1 and 2 in section 3 have to be modified: 
under a given underinvestment problem, the levels of the first best solution as well as 
the second best solution decrease. The first best level under mandatory audit partner 
rotation might then be found below the first best level without auditor rotation: the price 
for closing the expectation gap paid in the form of underinvestment might well be too 
high. 
Consequently, the stronger the influence of i on the level of audit quality in the second 
period, the more important it becomes to solve this underinvestment problem by 
adequate contractual means. This argument is relevant not only to audit partners but to 
all senior members of the auditing team whose specific investments may have a 
significant influence on the level of audit quality. An empirical indication for its 
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validity would be the fact that most audit firms are inclined to change the assignments 
of senior staff and audit partners significantly less often than the assignments of junior 
staff.  
If there is no way to transfer the specific investment i to the new audit partner, e.g. 
because communication is too costly, then the underinvestment problem cannot be 
solved under mandatory audit partner rotation. But this is a rather strict point of view. 
One can, for example, assume that at least part of the investment i can be transferred, 
e.g. because the new audit partner might benefit from well-structured and informative 
audit records established by the first audit partner as part of his specific investment.  
In the simplest case, both audit partners and/or the audit firm conclude an agreement 
that the first audit partners receive an amount equivalent to R2(i) from the new audit 
partner in addition to his other income s'(D). This solves the underinvestment problem 
as now the property right on the results of the investment i are well attributed from an 
incentive point of view.  
Applying this solution to auditing practice might nevertheless be difficult: only if R2(i) 
can be clearly identified will the appropriate transfers be made with certainty. 
Otherwise, the transfers might be either too low or too high. In the first case, the 
underinvestment problem with respect to the first auditor will be solved only partially. 
If, on the other hand, transfers are too high because too great a part of D2 is attributed to 
the first auditor's specific investment, this will increase the new auditor's tendency to 
underinvest. As we can assume that in most cases the identification of R2(i) will be 
rather difficult, the underinvestment problem will probably not be solved.  
5. Conclusions 
Summarizing our analysis we have found the following results with mandatory auditor 
rotation systems: 
  If the auditor's output is an experience good, the expectation gap can be closed by 
implementing multi-period contingent contracts with memory leading to a first best 
solution. Restricting the set of available contracts to rather short-term agreements by 
implementing mandatory rotation of audit firms opens up a new expectation gap. 
  If the auditor's output is a credence good, an expectation gap exists if the auditor is 
offered a fixed contract. In that case, mandatory rotation of audit firms has no effect 
at all on the expectation gap. 
  If in the case of credence goods a contingent contract can be offered based on 
monitoring instruments, the experience goods' first best result may be achieved. 
Mandatory rotation of audit firms then once again opens up a new expectation gap. 
  If mandatory audit partner rotation is implemented, a first best solution may be 
achieved with respect to the auditor's effort. On the other hand, underinvestment in 
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audit quality caused by auditor rotation may lead to a first best level of expected 
utility below the first best level in a no-rotation system. 
With respect to mandatory audit partner rotation, which is the most common type of 
auditor rotation system, an additional aspect is relevant concerning small size audit 
firms. As we have pointed out above, in their case audit partner rotation in fact leads to 
rotation of audit firms if their internal resources do not allow partner rotation. 
Consequently, a moral hazard problem remains with the small size firms whereas in big 
audit firms these problems can be solved as pointed out in section 4.  
The underinvestment problem described above may, nevertheless, occur not only under 
audit partner rotation but also under rotation of audit firms. Small size audit firms are 
thereby made worse off by mandatory audit partner rotation. Clients of small size firms 
face moral hazard and underinvestment problems whereas only the underinvestment 
problem is relevant to big size audit firms. Consequently, the position of the small size 
firms is weakened considerably in comparison to big size audit firms From the point of 
view of a public competitive policy aiming to reduce the concentration of economic 
power in the auditing sector, this is a particularly interesting result, strongly opposing 
mandatory audit partner rotation systems.  
A last point to discuss is whether the results indicate that preferably no auditor at all 
should take place. We would not agree with that. One the one hand, agency costs and/or 
costs of underinvestment decrease with the number of periods contracted with an 
auditor, but on the other hand, there should be some truth behind the argument of 
increasing auditor dependence with the number of periods contracted as well. Both cost 
curves indicate some optimal period of rotation T*. 
But if we consider the assumptions on which this optimal period of rotation is based, we 
find that they are largely in the nature of the auditor himself and of his specific tasks. T* 
should therefore vary significantly among different auditors as well as the audited 
industries. Consequently, the mandatory rotation period Trotation should be equivalent to 
T* only by accident. If T* > Trotation, the auditor rotation system causes the undesired 
consequences described above. If, on the other hand, T*   Trotation, the auditor rotation 
system is irrelevant. One can assume that based for example on audit liability rules or 
auditing standards implemented by the auditing profession themselves, the incentive for 
rotating at T* should be high enough so that a legal enforcement of Trotation is not 
necessary.  
The final conclusion is that neither rotation of audit partners nor rotation of audit firms 
should be made mandatory at all.  
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